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Jurisdiction of Supreme Court 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2-2(3)(a). On February 
1, 2001, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its ruling in Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT 
App 34, 18 P.3d 1129. After an extension of time was granted to file a petition for 
a writ of certiorari, a petition was filed by Bayles on March 30, 2001. After 
responses were filed, this Court exercised its discretionary authority, granted 
certiorari, and established a briefing schedule in this case. Bayles filed his 
opening brief on August 31, 2001. 
Standard of Review 
"On a writ of certiorari, [this Court] reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals, not that of the district court, and appl[ies] the same standard of review 
used by the court of appeals."1 The court of appeals would be correct only "if it 
accurately reviewed the [trial court's] decision under the appropriate standard of 
review."2 Since the issues raised relate to the interpretation of constitutional and, 
1 Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) (citation 
omitted.) 
2 Yeargin. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n., 2001 UT 11, 
P11; 20 P.3d 297. 
1 
indirectly, statutory provisions, the court of appeals decision is reviewed for 
"correctness."3 
Issues Presented for Review 
The following two issues were presented to this Court in the petition for writ 
of certiorari: 
Does an Appellate Court's affirmance of a trial court's ruling based on facts 
not found by the trial court nor proven by the Appellee [Bailey], and a legal theory 
that was not presented to the trial court, nor argued to the trial court, not decided by 
the trial court, and not briefed or argued to the Court of Appeals, infringe on the right 
of Appellant [Bayles] under the due process provisions of Article I § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1 of the United States Constitution? 
Does an Appellate Court's affirmance of a trial court's rulings based on facts 
not found by the trial court nor proven by the Appellee [Bailey], and a legal theory 
that was not presented to the trial court, nor argued to the trial court, not decided by 
the trial court, and not briefed or argued to the Court of Appeals, infringe on the right 
of the Appellant [Bayles] to the open use of the courts under Article I § 11 of the 
Utah Constitution? 
3 See Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, P9, 9 P.3d 762; Bear River 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, P4, 978 P.2d 460. 
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Determinative Law 
Bayles relies on the following constitutional and statutory provisions as being 
central to the resolution of this appeal: 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Section 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in 
his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay. 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: 
... [N]or shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-106.5(2) (1999): 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed 
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or 
a member of his immediate family; or 
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(ii) will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or 
a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-36-1(2)(i) (1999): 
... "Domestic violence" also means commission or attempt to commit, 
any of the following offenses by one cohabitant against another: ... (i) 
stalking, as described in Section 76-5-1 06.5; ... 
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-6-(2)(1) (1999): 
[A]ny cohabitant . . .who has been subject to abuse or domestic 
violence, or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of danger of abuse 
or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective order or a 
protective order in accordance with this chapter, whether or not the 
person has left the residence or the premises in an effort to avoid 
further abuse. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case 
Bailey sought an ex parte and permanent protective order against Bayles, her 
ex-husband, on the grounds that he was stalking her. After an extended trial, the 
trial court entered findings and made the original ex-parte injunction permanent. 
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Bayles appealed on the grounds that the findings of the trial court were not sufficient 
to establish a claim of domestic abuse based on stalking. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court's ruling based on an alternate legal theory not argued or 
presented by the parties and used facts from the disputed record and findings of the 
court in a different context than presented by the parties in the trial court to support 
its new found legal theory. Bayles has appealed contending that court of appeals 
"affirm on any ground" approach denied him constitutional protections guaranteeing 
"due process of law " and a "remedy by due course of law" for "injury done to this 
reputation." 
B. Appellate Court Proceedings 
An appeal from the permanent order entered by the trial against Bayles was 
filed with Court of Appeals on September 7, 1999. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court's ruling on February 1, 2001. A timely petition for a writ of certiorari 
was filed by Bayles on March 30, 2001. After appropriate briefing, this Court 
exercised its discretionary authority and established a briefing schedule in this case. 
Respondent Bayles was given until August 31, 2001 to file his opening brief. 
C. Disposition of the Case 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the result reached by the trial court. 
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Relevant Facts 
A. Findings of the Trial Court 
The Court of Appeals recognized that the following findings were found by the 
trial court as the basis for the conclusion that, as pled in the petition, Bayles had 
committed domestic violence by stalking Bailey: 
[Bayles] maintained visual or physical proximity to [Bailey] on the 
following occasions prior to the issuance of the July 7, 1998 protective 
order: 
A. On June 17, 1998, [Bayles] drove slowly by [Bailey] as she 
was getting out of her car to go into the house to have lunch. 
B. On May 18, 1998, [Bailey] and her husband went to the Old 
Timers cafe for lunch. The respondent circled around the restaurant 
twice and, as [Bailey] and her husband left the cafe, [Bayles] went to 
Parley Redds, made a U-turn, and followed [Bailey] and her husband 
to their employment at the School District office. 
C. On March 31, 1998, [Bayles] followed [Bailey] slowly in his 
truck as she walked home for lunch. 
D. On March 13, 1998, [Bayles] drove by [Bailey's and her 
second husband's] home 6 times. When she and her husband were 
leaving in the car to go for a ride, [Bayles] drove by, waving and 
honking. 
E. On June 10, 1998, Jeff Bailey, husband of [Bailey], was driving 
from Blanding to Monticello when [Bayles] pulled up close behind Mr. 
Bailey, then pulled alongside him, causing Mr. Bailey to slow down. 
[Bayles] drove alongside Mr. Bailey's vehicle at a speed of about 10 
mph and then pulled in front of Mr. Bailey and came to a complete stop 
in the road. Mr. Bailey then pulled out and went around [Bayles]. 
[Bayles] knew or should have known that the above conduct would 
cause emotional distress to [Bailey] and her husband, Jeff Bailey, 
because of the stormy marriage of 27 years during which [Bayles] 
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called [Bailey] foul and obscene names on many occasions, physically 
abused her by slapping her, and threatened her with bodily harm by 
holding a pistol to her neck in 1975, and by telling her in [sic] the 
opining [sic] day of deer season in the 1990' [sic] that he could kill her 
anytime he wanted. 4 
B. Additional Findings Made By the Court of Appeals 
In addition to these specific findings made by the trial court, the court of 
appeals opinions contains at least six alternate "findings" used, in part, to justify its 
"affirm on any ground" ruling affirming the result reached by the trial court. Each of 
the "findings" was derived from a milieu of disputed factual and legal claims. 
First, the court of appeals used the entire hearing record to determine the 
motivation of Bailey in filing the ex parte petition. 
Moreover, it is clear from the hearing record and from the trial court 
decision that Bailey initiated the action solely for the purpose of 
obtaining a protective order from her ex-spouse. Therefore, we 
conclude that it is appropriate for this court to review the trial court's 
decision in light of Bailey's initial petition for a protective order, rather 
than under the criminal Stalking statute.5 
Overlooked was the fact that the initial petition also sought a protective for her 
husband, Jeff Bailey, and her youngest, adult daughter (with Bayles), Sharo 
Burtenshaw.6 Jeff Bailey was dismissed on a directed verdict after the presentation 
4 See Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, 1f 5, 18 P.3d 1129. 
5 lQ. at 1[9, n. 3 (emphasis added.) 
6 See Record 1-9. 
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of Bailey's case.7 Thereafter, Share Burtenshaw was formally dismissed from any 
request to be included in a permanent protective order.8 
Second, in an effort to show Bayles had been given notice of the factual 
claims that court of appeals were using under Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-2(1) to affirm 
the trial court legal conclusions under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-106.5 (1999), the court 
of appeals recited some allegations in the Petition filed by Bailey: 
Also listed were nearly forty phone calls from unlisted numbers where 
the caller either hung-up prior to or immediately after either Bailey or 
her current husband answered the phone. Bailey also submitted an 
affidavit to the court roughly outlining one witness's testimony 
concerning repeated complaints filed against Bailey and her husband 
by Bayles at their place of employment.9 
While, admitting early on in the opinion that "the trial court did not find that each of 
these incidents occurred by a preponderance of the evidence,"10 the court of appeals 
specifically relied on the existence of these alleged phone calls in its conclusion to 
describe Bailey's conduct and justify affirming the trial court's result. 11 
7 Record at 167, Transcript of April12, 1999, page 203, lines 1-20. This was 
noted in the Opening Appellate Brief of Bayles on page 4. 
8 Record at 167, Transcript of April13, 1999, page 434, line 22- page 436, 
line 12. This was noted in the Opening Appellate Brief of Bayles on pages 4-5. 
9 Bailey v. Bayles, supra, 2001 UT App 34, ~ 2, n. 1. 
10 kl 
11 1.Q. at~ 15. 
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Third, building on a trial court finding that Bayles had "slapped" Bailey, the 
court of appeals embellished the record by finding that "Bayles had pursued a 
pattern of physical violence that included pushing ... and punching Bailey."12 No 
such finding was made by the trial court. 
Fourth, the Court of Appeals found that "in both her petition and during her 
testimony, Bailey clearly indicated that she experienced a constant fear of Bayles, a fear 
that was aggravated with every incident."13 No where in the record is there any agreement 
that the verified petition -admitted as testimony- could be treated as "fact". The trial 
court's findings failed to address many Bailey's claims, much less find they have been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. There is no trial court finding that Bailey's 
"fear was aggravated with every incident." 
Fifth, the court of appeals found that "[b]ased on Bailey's testimony, the trial court 
correctly concluded in its memorandum decision that Bailey's emotional distress was 
reasonable." While the findings of the trial court identified that" [Bayles] knew or should 
have known that the above conduct would cause emotional distress to [Bailey] and 
her husband, Jeff Bailey,"14 there were no findings, as required by existing law, that (1) 
the emotional distress of Bailey constituted more than "anxiety and annoyance," (2) that 
it was objectively "reasonable," or (3) that the conduct of Bayles inducing the emotional 
12 ld. at 1J13. 
13 Op. cit. at 1J14. 
14 ld. at 1J5. 
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distress is "'outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards 
of decency and morality.'"15 
Sixth, using "[t]he record before us", the court of appeals concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to support 
the trial court's determination that following the parties' separation, Bayles 
intentionally created in Bailey an imminent fear of physical harm. Finally, we 
conclude that Bayles's conduct ... coupled with the evidence of past abuse 
.. .was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Bailey's fear was both 
reasonable and real. 16 
Forgotten was the fact that the trial court's ruling did not address or accept the fear of 
bodily injury argument made by Bailey's counsel. 
In order to determine whether the ex parte order should continue as a 
permanent order, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. 
Throughout this hearing, the parties were represented by counsel, and Bailey 
urged the court to focus on the fear of bodily injury prong of each of the 
conjunctive elements of the stalking statute .... The court was also provided 
with the citation to and the language from Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 
1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting the emotional distress prong 
of section 76-5-106.5), and the court acknowledge the provisions of that 
case. 
Presumably rejecting Bailey's urging of the fear of bodily injury prong 
within the elements of section 76-5-106.5, the court issued a memorandum 
decision that contained findings of fact and conclusions of law focusing on 
the emotional distress prong of the first two required elements of the stalking 
statute, rather than the fear of bodily injury prong of these elements. 17 
In summary, the" findings" of the court of appeals 
relies on evidence from the record, admitted in support of Bailey's claims, 
and [even when the trial court did not find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that some of the factual claims were valid,] applies [them] to a 
15 Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
16 Bailey v. Bayles, supra, 2001 UT App 34, ~ 15. 
17 ld. at~~ 21-22, (Davis, J., dissenting.) 
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completely different claim As a result, [the divided panel] is reshaping the 
relevance and importance of evidence that was presented against Bayles in 
the earlier proceeding. 18 
Summary of the Argument 
Had the facts found by the trial court been reviewed on appeal under binding 
precedent, the trial court would have necessarily been reversed and the case 
dismissed. Because Bayles had a meritorious claim on appeal, the divided panel 
denied him "due process of law" when he was not provided with notice nor an 
opportunity to respond to the novel arguments used by the Court of Appeals that (1) 
used a legal theory to justified Bailey's claims on the merits that she had never 
raised at trial or on appeal, (2) created its own factual record independent of the trial 
court or undisputed facts in the record, and (3) failed to follow binding legal 
precedent applicable to the factual findings made by the trial court. Even if the 
equitable considerations of this case may merit some "injustice" to Bayles, the right 
of Bailey to have remedy by "due course of law" when seeking to defend and protect 
his reputation prevents the court of appeals from failing to follow existing precedent, 
usurping the role of the litigants to frame factual and legal parameters of their cases, 
and ignoring the constitutional recognition of the role of a trial judge to make findings 
and apply the law to the facts presented before the court. Thus, even if the minimal 
standards of "due process of law" have been satisfied by application of "affirm on any 
18 1d. at~ 19, (Davis, J., dissenting.) 
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ground" doctrine, the higher level of protection provided by "due course of law" 
protections require reversal of the court of appeals and dismissal of Bailey's case. 
Argument 
I. Review of the Original Decision of the Trial Court As Briefed 
and Argued Should Have Resulted In Reversal and Dismissal 
Under existing case law, the trial court improperly applied the statutory 
requirements of stalking that were specifically relied upon by Bailey to seek the 
protective order. In dissent, Judge Davis explains why Bayles's arguments below 
and on appeal satisfied the requirements of existing precedent. 
Bayles claims that the trial court erred in its application of the stalking 
statute to the facts found in this case. Legal determinations regarding 
the trial court's application of the law to the set of facts are reviewed 
with more deference than the trial court's interpretation of the law ... 
. Bayles also claims that the trial court erred by not making findings on 
all the elements of the stalking statute .... 
Although the three conjunctive elements of the crime of stalking may be 
based upon a showing of emotional distress or reasonable fear of 
bodily injury, the court based its conclusions on the emotional distress 
prong. This court has stated that 'the emotional distress [prong] is not 
satisfied by causing mere anxiety of annoyance.' Salt Lake City v. 
Lopez, 935 P .2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting the 
element of emotional distress contained in the stalking statute). 
Furthermore, Lopez requires that 'emotional distress results from 
conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the 
generally accepted of decency and morality." ld. (citations omitted.) 
Thus, regarding the trial court's ruling on the first element of the stalking 
statute in light of our ruling in Lopez, the trial court erred in concluding 
that Bayles engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a 
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reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.19 Here, the court's 
findings in support of its conclusion that Bayles 'intentionally or 
knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at (Bailey] that 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress(,]' do not 
evidence outrageous and intolerable conduct that offends generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. Bayles's actions of 
following Bailey and driving by her house would have been annoying 
and may have induced anxiety; however, five such instances spread 
out over a four month period do not support the conclusion that Bayles 
engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person 
to suffer anything more than mere anxiety or annoyance. Because of 
our ruling in Lopez, which was well argued before the trial court in this 
case, I would hold the court erred in its application of the emotional 
distress prong of the stalking statute to the findings in this case. 
In reviewing the trial court's application of the second element of the 
stalking statute to the facts of this case, the findings support the trial 
court's conclusion that Bayles knew or should have known that his 
conduct would cause emotional distress to Bailey. However, the court 
did not specifically find, in support of this element, that plaintiff suffered 
from more than anxiety and annoyance, perhaps because the plaintiff 
put on no objective evidence thereof. Cf. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970,973-975 (Utah 1993) (holding that emotional 
distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental 
illness); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (finding that emotional distress requires extreme outrageous 
behavior). 
As for the third element of the stalking statute, the court did not make 
any findings or conclusions regarding whether Bayles's conduct actually 
caused emotional distress in Bailey or a member of her family. 
Consequently, the court committed reversible error when it failed to 
19 Justice Davis' footnote at this portion of his opinion reads as follows: "This 
'reasonable person' standard 'prevents the finder of fact from establishing its own 
standard and establishes the requisite objective standard [to provide fair notice of 
the prohibited conduct].' State v. Reusch, 214 Wis.2d 548, 571 N.W.2d 898, 905 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997). Bailey introduced virtually no objective evidence of 
emotional distresss." 
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make findings or conclusions regarding this material issue.20 ••• 
Furthermore, after a careful review of the record, it is not clear that the 
facts support only a determination that Bayles's conduct had actually 
caused Bailey emotional distress .... 21 
Because Bailey did not satisfy the required statutory requirements defined in her 
petition, the protective order should have been dismissed by the trial court. 
II. While Affirming on Any Ground, the Court of Appeals 
Denied Bayles Due Process of Law 
This Court has held 
that Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the 
same as the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . At a 
minimum, 'timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard 
in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness."22 
Justice Davis did not claim that there was any difference in degree of protection 
provided by the United States and Utah "due process of law" provisions;23 neither 
does Bayles. 
20 Justice Davis' footnote at this portion of his opinion reads as follows: 
"Emotional distress is a material issue because it is one of the elements of the 
crime of stalking." 
21 See Bailey v. Bayles, supra 2001 UT App 34, ~~ 25-28. 
22 In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted.) 
23 Op. cit. at~ 18 n. 4. 
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A. Finding of "New Facts" Were Made Without Notice or Hearing 
Six different "new" factual findings made by the court of appeals from a 
disputed or non-existent record were noted under the factual recitations listed above. 
None were undisputed. Thus, even if it was appropriate for the court of appeals to 
redetermine factual findings so as to adopt them for a new theory or equitable result, 
Bayles was never afforded a "timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard in a meaningful way"24 as to the evidence relied upon by the appellate court. 
B. Due Process Rights Implicated 
Judge Davis, in dissent, adequately explains why the Court of Appeals' "affirm 
on any ground" in this case implicated Bayles's right to due process of law. 
Today we decide a case that was not presented to the trial court, not 
argued to the trial court, not decided by the trial court, and not briefed 
or argued to this court. The majority affirms the judgment of the trial 
court based on this court's power to "affirm on any ground." ... 
However, it is well established that parties define the parameters of 
their case and that, except on legal issues, it is improper for the 
appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. See 
Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) ('It is inappropriate in 
most instances for an appellate court to disregard the trial court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and to assume the task of 
weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact.") In my view, 
application of the "affirm on any ground" approach by the majority in 
this case amounts to a determination that the record establishes 
Jeroldene Bailey is entitled to relief as a matter of law on what ever 
theory the appellate court feels comfortable with, and nothing the 
parties may have done or omitted to do and nothing the trial court may 
have found would affect the outcome. Otherwise, the appellate court 
would be depriving the parties of one of the most fundamental tenets 
of due process - notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Dairy 
24 In re Worthen, supra, 926 P.2d at 876. 
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Prod. Servs. v. City of Wellsville, 2001 UT 81, 1f 49, 13 P.3d 581 ('The 
minimum requirements [of due process] are adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.")25 
Specifically, the majority's affirmance of the trial court relies on 
evidence from the record, admitted in support of Bailey's claim, and 
applies it to a completely different claim. As a result, [the Court of 
Appeals] is reshaping the relevance and importance of the evidence 
that was presented against Bayles in the earlier proceeding. Such an 
approach is improper in the present case because, had Bayles been 
aware that certain testimony was or would become determinative of the 
different case decided by the court of appeals, his trial strategy and/or 
his arguments on appeal may have changed dramatically. Similarly, 
had the trial court heard the case now decided by the court of appeals 
and the evidence relied upon by the court of appeals in that context, its 
findings, conclusions, and rulings may have been totally different.26 
Therefore, it would 'result in an injustice to the appellant' .for this court 
to focus on what amounts to a different case in an effort to affirm the 
erroneous ruling of the trial courtY 
Bayles contends that when the court of appeals revised the factual "findings" made 
by the trial court and presented in a disputed record, and applied them to a legal 
theory that had never been presented to the appellate court by any party, he was 
25 kL. at 1f 18. 
26 Justice Davis' footnote at this portion of his opinion reads as follows: "I am 
also troubled by the majority's reliance on instances of abuse that allegedly 
occurred anywhere from four to twenty-five years before the petition for a 
protective order was filed. While the trial court relied on that evidence in support 
of its conclusion relative to Bayles['s] knowledge or constructive knowledge, the 
majority, without any opportunity for the parties or trial court to address the issue, 
uses the evidence as direct evidence of a substantively different type of domestic 
violence." 
27 ld. at 1f 19. 
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denied due process of law. This unconstitutional conduct merits reversal of the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Ill. "Remedy By Due Course of Law" Provides Bayles 
More Protection Than "Due Process of Law" 
Justice Davis acknowledged that there may be a conflict between more 
modern precedent with broadly worded authority to "affirm on any ground" and early 
precedent of this Court: 
While this court is not bound by the reasons given by the trial court for 
its conclusions, but may affirm or modify a judgment upon any legal 
ground appearing in the record, still it is not bound to do so, and ought 
not to in an equitable proceeding if it might result in an injustice to the 
appellant. 28 
Bayles contends that the conduct of the Court of Appeals that has denied him due 
process of law has resulted in an "injustice" to him and should be reversed. 
However, to the degree that any newer precedent of "affirm on any ground" may be 
used to overcome the minimal notice and hearing requirements of "due process of 
law," Bayles contends that the "due course of law" provisions of Article I Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution require the Court to reverse the court of appeals. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 , provides that 
[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay. 
28 Huntsman v. Huntsman, 56 Utah 609, 192 P. 368, 374 (1920). 
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An interpretation of this provision may properly include an analysis of the language 
itself, how sister states have acted on similar provisions, and policy arguments. 29 
A. Textual Interpretation 
This Court has repeatedly interpreted the clear language of this section to 
"guarantee access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness 
and equity."30 This interpretative language- this judicial gloss- indicates that the 
protections by this section are likely more expansive than the minimal "notice and 
opportunity to be heard" required by "due process of law" noted earlier. In addition, 
the textual recognition elsewhere in the Utah Constitution that there shall be "a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court"31 which shall have "original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,"32 
indicates at a minimum an anticipated need to respect the prerogatives of a district 
court that makes factual findings after the taking of evidence when determining what 
"judicial procedure" is based on "fairness and equity." 
29 In re Worthen, supra, 926 P.2d at 866-867. 
30 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Utah 1998) cert. denied 526 U.S. 
1130,119 S.Ct. 1803,143 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1999) (citation omitted). 
31 Utah Canst. Art. VIII § 1 . 
32 Utah Canst. Art. VIII § 5. 
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B. Treatment of Text By Sister States 
Other states have language in their constitutions that is similar to that of Utah. 
Indiana and Texas are two of them. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees a "remedy by due 
course of law" for injuries to "person, property or reputation." Unlike the Utah 
Constitution, Indiana's constitution has no "due process" provision. However, like 
the federal due process clauses, the claimant seeking relief must have a "protectable 
interest" that of which they have been deprived without a fair hearing;" many other 
interpretations of the federal due process clause, however, do not apply.33 If these 
interpretations were accepted as relevant to Utah's provisions, having properly 
perfected an appeal, Bayles has an definable interest in (1) having a trial court ruling 
reversed when it was not made in accordance with statutory and case law reversed, 
and (2) having his appellate request considered in accordance with existing 
restraints on the court of appeals. 
Article I, Section 13 of the Texas constitution also promises that "all courts 
shall be open" and remedies "by due course of law" are available to all persons for 
injuries to "lands, goods, person or reputation." The provisions guaranteeing "'due 
course of law are guarantees to citizens and not governments or their agents."'34 If 
33 Mcintosh v. Melroe Company, 729 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind. 2000) (citations 
omitted). 
34 Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 344 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987) (citations omitted.) 
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these interpretations were accepted as relevant to Utah's provisions, Bayles can 
assert that the "due course of law" are to be limitations to governmental - and 
judicial - action rather than an open invitation to create a new "due course of law" 
to meet the perception of what those holding governmental powers believe to be 
appropriate. 
C. Policy Arguments 
Two clearly established policies of judicial review would be undermined were 
this Court to fail to interpret Article I Section 11 as including judicial restraint on the 
ability of a court of appeals who, when confronted with an erroneous decision under 
existing case law, makes "new" findings of fact to support an effort to uphold an 
erroneous decision by adopting a legal theory that was not offered at the trial or 
appellate level. 
First, an appellate court's right to substitute its own judgment for the "equitable 
holdings" of the trial court is limited except in the case of "manifest injustice." 
With respect to the court of appeals' power to make equitable decisions 
in domestic relations matters, the court of appeals is not entitled to 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court except in the 
extraordinary circumstance of 'manifest injustice' .... Therefore, to the 
extent the court of appeals overruled the equitable holdings of the trial 
court and substituted its own judgment, 'we afford [the court of appeals] 
considerably less discretion than we would afford a trial court on direct 
appeal.'35 
35 Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ~1'10, 984 P.2d 987 (citations omitted). 
20 
While the legislative and judicial desire to limit domestic abuse is laudable, a 
"judicial procedure" that allows an appellate court to usurp the role of the trial court 
is not based on "fairness and equity" as required by the Open Courts provision. 
Second, at the time of the trial and on appeal, the governing case law defining 
what constituted emotional distress in a stalking case was very carefully defined in 
the case of Salt Lake City v. Lopez. 36 The trial and appeal strategy of Bayles relied 
heavily on the legal requirements articulated in that case. As applied to the factual 
findings of the trial court, under Lopez, Bayles was entitled to a dismissal of the 
request for a permanent protective order. "[A] rule of law pronounced by a panel 
governs all later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other panels of 
that court and courts of lower rank."37 No party challenged the trial court's findings 
regarding emotional distress; the appellate court had no basis to depart from the 
findings of fact made by the trial court. Under these circumstances, the legal 
restrictions imposed on those seeking to prove emotional distress in a stalking case 
as outlined in Lopez were binding on the parties, the trial court, and the court of 
appeals. To allow an appellate court to adopt a new legal theory and change factual 
findings and inferences from a disputed trial court record to meet the requirements 
of the new theory allows the panel to evade their duty to follow binding precedent. 
36 935 P .2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
37 Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) 
(citation omitted.) 
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A "judicial procedure" that allows an appellate court to fail to adhere to the legal 
precedent established by another panel of equal rank is not based on "fairness and 
equity" as required by the Open Courts provision. 
Thus, an examination of the text of the Utah Constitution, its present 
interpretation, that of other states, and existing judicial policies all suggest that 
Bayles' right to "due course of law" on appeal provides him with greater protections 
than afforded him by the "due process of law" constitutional provisions. Application 
of the "due course of law provisions" also justifies reversal. 
Conclusion 
Had the facts found by the trial court been reviewed on appeal under the 
binding precedent of Salt Lake City v. Lopez, the trial court would have necessarily 
been reversed and the Bailey's protective order against Bayles dismissed. 
Because Bayles had a meritorious claim on appeal, the divided panel denied 
him "due process of law" when he was not provided with notice nor an opportunity 
to respond to the novel arguments used by the court of appeals that (1) used a legal 
theory to justified Bailey's claims on the merits that she had never raised at trial or 
on appeal, (2) created its own factual record independent of the trial court or 
undisputed facts in the record, and (3) failed to follow binding legal precedent 
applicable to the factual findings made by the trial court. 
Even if the equitable considerations of this case may merit some "injustice" to 
Bayles, the right of Bailey to have remedy by "due course of law" when seeking to 
22 
defend and protect his reputation provides him greater protection against 
government malfeasance than does the "due process of law" provisions. This is 
shown by the text of the Utah constitution, Utah case law interpreting the same, 
decisions of sister states addressing similar issues, and judicial policies such as the 
role of the trial court in making findings of fact and the obligation of appellate panels 
to follow existing precedent of other appellate panels. 
Thus, even if the minimal standards of "due process of law" have been 
satisfied by application of "affirm on any ground" doctrine, the higher level of 
protection provided by "due course of law" protections require reversal of the court 
of appeals and dismissal of Bailey's protective order against Bayles. 
DATED and EXECUTED this 31 51 day of August, 2001. 
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THORNE, Judge: 
~1 Respondent/Appellant Randee Bayles appeals the trial court's 
decision granting Petitioner/Appellee Jeroldene Bailey's petition 
for a permanent protective order. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
~2 In January of 1997, Bayles and Bailey, after twenty-seven 
years of marriage, separated and ultimately divorced. Bailey 
subsequently filed a Verified Petition for a Protective Order 
against Bayles. In the petition, Bailey alleged that following 
their separation Bayles had initiated a pattern of behavior 
intended to inttmidate and cause her fear. Bailey's petition 
listed several specific incidents, which covered nearly four 
pages, and included repeated examples of unwanted and unnecessary 
contact initiated by Bayles. 1 B~iley characterized Bayles's 
1. The petition listed twenty incidents involving Bayles. Also 
listed were nearly forty phone calls from unlisted numbers where 
the caller either hung-up prior to or immediately after either 
Bailey or her current husband answered the phone. Bailey also 
submitted an affidavit to the court roughly outlining one 
(continued ... ) 
behavior as stalking, however, at no point did she file a 
criminal Stalking compla~nt against Bayles. 2 
~3 In addition, Bailey's petition asserted that throughout the 
parties' marriage Bayles had physically, emotionally, and 
mentally abused her. In support of this claim, Bailey provided 
specific examples of abuse, including allegations that Bayles had 
at least twice threatened to kill her. 
~4 The trial court, after conducting several hearings 
concerning Bailey's petition, concluded by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Bayles had "been stalking [Bailey] by intentionally 
or knowingly engaging in a course of conduct directed at [Bailey] 
that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress 
herself." 
~5 The trial court issued the following specific factual 
findings in support of its grant of the petition: 
1. The respondent maintained a visual or 
physical proximity to cefendant on two 
or more occasions as follows: 
A. On June 17, 1998, the 
respondent drove slowly by the 
petitioner as she was getting 
out of her car to go into the 
house to have lunch. 
B. On May 18, 1998, the 
petitioner and her husband 
went to the Old Timers cafe 
for lunch. The respondent 
circled around the restaurant 
twice and, as the petitioner 
and her husband left the cafe, 
the respondent went to Parley 
Redds, made a U-turn, and 
followed petitioner and her 
1. ( ... continued) 
witness's testimony concerning repeated complaints filed against 
Bailey and her husband by Bayles at their place of employment. 
While the trial court did not find each of these incidents 
occurred by a preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Bayles was 
clearly on notice of the nature of the petition and the 
underlying allegations supporting it. 
2. For clarity, we refer to criminal Stalking using a capital 
"S" and behavior referred to as stalking with a small "s." 
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husband to their employment at 
the School District office. 
C. On March 31, 1998, the 
respondent followed the 
petitioner slowly in his truck 
as she walked home for lunch. 
D. On March 31, 1998, the 
respondent drove by 
petitioner's home 6 times. 
When she and her husband were 
leaving in the car to go for a 
ride, the respondept drove by, 
waving and honking. 
E. On June 10, 1998, Jeff Bailey, 
husband of the petitioner, was 
driving from Blanding to 
Monticello when the respondent 
pulled up close behind Mr. 
Bailey, then pulled alongside 
him, causing Mr. Bailey to 
slow down. Respondent drove 
alongside Mr. Bailey's vehicle 
at a speed of about 10 mph and 
then pulled in front of Mr. 
Bailey and came to a complete 
stop in the road. Mr. Bailey 
then pulled out and went 
around the respondent. 
2. The respondent knew or should have known 
that the above conduct would cause 
emotional distress to the petitioner or 
to her husband, Jeff Bailey, because of 
the stormy marriage of 27 years during 
which the respondent called the 
petitioner foul and obscene names on 
many occasions, physically abused her by 
slapping her, and threatened her with 
bodily harm by holding a pistol to her 
neck in 1975, and by telling her in 
[sic] the opining [sic] day of deer 
season in the 1990' [sic] that he could 
kill her anytime he wanted. 
~6 The trial court, after granting Bailey's petition, used the 
standard protective order form, and restricted Bayles from the 
following: (1) attempting, threatening, or committing any 
further domestic abuse against Bailey; (2) attempting, 
threatening, or committing further violence against Bailey's 
husband; (3) contacting, harassing, telephoning or otherwise 
communicating with Bailey; (4) trespassing at Bailey's place of 
residence; and (5) interfering with or appearing at Bailey's 
workplace. 
,7 Bayles appeals from the trial court's grant of a protective 
order. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
,8 Bayles argues that, because the trial court relied on Utah's 
criminal Stalking statute, see Utah Code ~~n. § 76-5-106.5 
(1999), the trial court's findings do not satisfy the requisite 
burden of proof to prove that Bayles Stalked Bailey, and 
therefore, the order should be reversed and Bailey's petition 
dismissed. 
,9 However, while we agree that the trial court concluded 
Bayles had been Stalking Bailey, pursuant to section 76-5-106.5, 
we need not address the sufficiency of this conclusion. "It is 
well-established that [we] may affirm a 'judgment, order, or 
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record, ' even though that ground or theory 
was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its 
ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 461 P.2d 290, 
293 n.2 (Utah 1969)); see also Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 
1060 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 3 
3. This is a long established practice of appellate courts both 
in and out of Utah. See, e.g., 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error§ 714 
("the appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree 
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent from the record"); see also Rasmussen v. Davis, 262 P.2d 
488, 489 (Utah 1953) (holding that it is the accepted policy of 
the court to affirm a trial court's ruling on other grounds "if 
the conclusion reached, though based on incorrect reasons, is in 
fact correct for some other reason" (footnote omitted)). In the 
instant case, the trial court concluded that Bayles had engaged 
in Stalking Bailey. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999). 
However, in our view the trial court also characterized the 
totality of Bayles's actions as non-criminal stalking in an 
attempt to describe Bayles's conduct towards Bailey. Moreover, 
it is clear from the hearing record and from the trial court 
decision that Bailey initiated the action solely for the purpose 
of obtaining a protective order against her ex-spouse. 
Therefore, we conclude that it is appropriate for this court to 
(continued ... ) 
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ANALYSIS 
~10 Bayles argues that the trlal court's factual findings do not 
support its conclusion that he had been Stalking Bailey following 
the parties separation and divorce. However, we need not address 
this argument. The issue now before this court is whether the 
trial court's decision to grant Bailey's petition for a 
protective order is supported by either the trial court's 
specific findings or the undisputed evidence. See Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d at 1060. 
~11 Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-2(1) (1999) sets forth the 
requirements that a party must meet to obtain a protective order. 
In pertinent part, section 30-6-2(1) states: 
[a]ny cohabitant . who has been subjected 
to abuse or domestic violence, or to whom 
there is a substantial likelihood of 
immediate danger of abuse or domestic 
violence, may seek an ex parte protective 
order or a protective order in accordance 
with this chapter, whether or not that person 
has left the residence or the premises in an 
effort to avoid further abuse. 
Id. 4 Further, in Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) we explained the requirements of section 30-6-2(1), 
concluding that 
3. ( ... continued) 
review the trial court's decision in light of Bailey's initial 
petition for protective order, rather than under the criminal 
Stalking statute. 
4. In response to a growing concern, nationwide as well as in 
Utah, surrounding the recognition of domestic violence as a clear 
community problem, the Utah Legislature adopted a statewide 
response in the Cohabitant Abuse Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-
6-1 to 14 (1999). Whether by design or accident, a significant 
number of victims had previously found that orders of protection 
were not available to them. The purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act was to create a timely and simplified process whereby some 
level of protection and safety could be afforded to victims who 
had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available to 
persons involved in criminal prosecutions. These orders would 
require that the party subject to the order of protection leave 
the victim alone and provide for some measurable and enforceable 
safeguards, as determined by the court. 
[s]ection 30-6-2 clearly indicates that "any 
person who has been subjected to abuse" may 
seek a protective order. Further, because 
"abuse" is defined as "intentionally placing 
another in fear of imminent physical harm," 
if past abuse is coupled with a present 
threat of future abuse, a person may seek a 
protective order. 
Strollo, 828 P.2d at 534 (quoting Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 
196, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)). 
~12 Therefore, to obtain a protective order, Bailey was required 
only co demonstrace, (1) she is or w~s a cohabitant of the 
respondent, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(1) (1998) 5 ; (2) 
she had suffered physical abuse or domestic violence, as defined 
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1 (1999); and (3) she had an imminent 
fear of physical harm or, put another way, "'a present fear of 
future abuse.'" See Strollo, 828 P.2d at 534 (citation omitted). 
~13 In March and April of 1999, the trial court held evidentiary 
hearings on Bailey's petition for a protective order, after which 
the trial court concluded that, over the course of their twenty-
seven year marriage, Bayles had pursued a pattern of physical 
violence that included pushing, slapping, and punching Bailey. 
The trial court also found that Bayles had both verbally and 
emotionally abused Bailey during their marriage--abuse that 
included Bayles putting a gun to Bailey's neck and telling her he 
could kill her at any time. Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly concluded that Bayles had subjected Bailey to physical 
abuse and domestic violence. 
~14 The trial court also found that after the separation, 
(1) Bayles had repeatedly followed Bailey in his car, both while 
she was on foot and in her vehicle; and (2) Bayles had also 
repeatedly followed Bailey's current husband, conduct that 
included a potentially volatile incide~t on an is~lated &nd 
deserted stretch of highway. Further, the trial court found that 
Bayles had twice threatened Bailey's life. Finally, in both her 
petition and during her testimony, Bailey clearly indicated to 
the trial court that she experienced a constant fear of Bayles, a 
fear that was aggravated with every incident. Based on Bailey's 
testimony, the trial court correctly concluded in its memorandum 
decision that Bailey's emotional distress was reasonable. 
~15 From the record before us, we conclude that the evidence 
supports the trial court's finding that Bayles abused Bailey 
5. Because Bailey does not dispute that Bayles meets this 
requirement, we do not examine it. 
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during their marriage. We further conclude Bailey presented 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination 
that, following their separation, Bayles intentionally created 
in Bailey an imminent fear of physical harm. Finally, we 
conclude that Bayles's conduct--repeatedly following Bailey, 
following Bailey's husband, repeatedly calling Bailey's home and 
workplace, coupled with the evidence of past abuse--was 
sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Bailey's fear was 
both reasonable and real. See Strollo, 828 P.2d at 535. 
,16 Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 
granting Bailey's petition and issuing the requested protective 
order. 
,17 I CONCUR: 
~ussell W. Bench, Judge 
DAVIS, Judge (dissenting): 
,18 Today we decide a case that was not presented to the trial 
court, not argued to the trial court, not decided by the trial 
court, and not briefed or argued to this court. 1 The majority 
affirms the judgment of the trial court based on this court's 
power to "affirm on any ground." The genesis of the 11 affirm on 
any ground" approach in Utah is unclear, 2 and current statements 
1. Bailey requested a protective order based on her claim that 
Bayles was stalking her; therefore, the evidence presented at the 
hearing, the findings of the trial court, the conclusions of the 
trial court and the briefs on appeal all focused on Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999) (the statute defining the crime of 
stalking) . 
2. See Huntsman v. Huntsman, 56 Utah 609, 192 P. 368, 374 (1920) 
("While this court is not bound by the reasons given by the trial 
court for its conclusions, but may affirm or modify a judgment 
(continued ... ) 
of the approach are broad enough to encompass a virtual retrial 
of the case by the appellate court. 3 However, it is well 
established that parties define the parameters of their case and 
that, except on legal issues, it is improper for the appellate 
court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 
See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) ("It is 
inappropriate in most instances for an appellate court to 
disregard the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and to assume the task of weighing evidence and making its 
own findings of fact."). In my view, application of the "affirm 
on any ground" approach by the majority in this case amounts to a 
determination that the record establishes that Jeroldene Bailey 
is entitled to relief as a matter of law on whatever theory the 
appellate court feels comfortable wi~h, and nothing the parties 
may have done or omitted to do and nothing the trial court may 
have found would affect the outcome. Otherwise, the appellate 
court would be depriving the parties of one of the most 
fundamental tenets of due process--notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. See Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 
81,~49, 13 P.3d 581 ("The minimum requirements [of due process] 
are adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful manner. ") . 4 
~19 Here, the trial court decided the case that was presented 
and the majority's "affirm on any ground" approach is 
inappropriate. Specifically, the majority's affirmance of the 
trial court relies on evidence from the record, admitted in 
support of Bailey's claim, and applies it to a completely 
different claim. As a result, this court is reshaping the 
relevance and importance of evidence that was presented against 
Bayles in the earlier proceeding. Such an approach is improper 
in the present case because, had Bayles been aware that certain 
2. ( ... continued) 
upon any legal ground appearing iu the record, still it is not 
bound to do so, and ought not to in an equitable proceeding if it 
might result in injustice to the appellant.") i see also Limb v. 
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 
n. 2 (1969) ("The law is well settled that a trial court should be 
affirmed if on the record made it can be."). 
3. See Goodsel v. Dep't. of Bus. Reg., 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
1974) . 
4. I agree with the majority that the Legislature enacted the 
Cohabitant Abuse Act in an attempt to deal with the serious 
problem of domestic violence, and I acknowledge the majority's 
desire to remedy the same. However, the important purposes of 
the Cohabitant Abuse Act do not trump due process of law. See 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1i Utah Const. art. I, § 7. 
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testimony was or would become determinative of the different case 
decided by the court of appeals, his trial strategy and/or his 
arguments on appeal may have changed dramatically. Similarly, 
had the trial court heard the case now decided by the court of 
appeals and the evidence relied upon by the court of appeals in 
that context, its findings, conclusions, and rulings may have 
been totally different. 5 Therefore, it would 11 result in 
injustice to the appellant 11 for this court to focus on what 
amounts to a different case in an effort to affirm the erroneous 
ruling of the trial court. Huntsman, 192 P. at 374. In the case 
that was tried and appealed, I would hold that the trial court•s 
conclusion that Bayles was stalking Bailey was in error for the 
following reasons. 
~20 On July 7, 1998, Bailey, Bayles•s ex-wife, filed a verified 
petition for a protective order against Bayles, and the court 
granted an ex parte protective order on the same day. The ex 
parte order was issued pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act which 
allows the court to issue an ex parte protective order if it 
appears from the petition that domestic violence or abuse has 
occurred. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(1) (1999). 
~21 In order to determine whether the ex parte order should 
continue as a permanent order, the court held an evidentiary 
hearing on the petition. Throughout this hearing, the parties 
were represented by counsel, and Bailey urged the court to focus 
on the fear of bodily injury prong of each of the conjunctive 
elements of the stalking statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-
106.5 (1999) (defining the crime of stalking), 6 & 77-36-1 (2) (i) 
5. I am also troubled by the majority•s reliance on instances of 
abuse that allegedly occurred anywhere from four to twenty-five 
years before the petition for a protective order was filed. 
While the trial court relied on that evidence in support of its 
conclusion relative to Bayles knowledge or constructive 
knowledge, the majority, without any opportunity for the parties 
or the trial court to address the issue, uses the evidence as 
direct evidence of a substantively different type of domestic 
violence. 
6. A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a 
course of conduct directed at a specific 
person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or 
a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to 
himself or a member of his immediate 
family; 
{continued ... ) 
(1999) (stating that stalking is an act of domestic violence) . 
The court was also provided with the citation to and the language 
from Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (interpreting the emotional distress prong of section 76-5-
106.5), and the court acknowledged the provisions of that case. 
~22 Presumably rejecting Bailey's urging of the fear of bodily 
injury prong within the elements of section 76-5-106.5, the court 
issued a memorandum decision that contained findings of fact and 
conclusions of law focusing on the emotional distress prong of 
the first two of the required elements of the stalking statute, 
rather than the fear of bodily injury prong of these elements. 
The memorandum decision contained no findings or conclusions 
addressing the third required eleme~t--whether Bayles's ccnduct 
actually caused Bailey to suffer emotional distress or fear of 
bodily injury--but the court nonetheless ultimately concluded 
that Bayles had engaged in domestic violence because he had been 
stalking his ex-wife. Specifically, the court concluded: (1) 
"[R]espondent has been stalking petitioner by intentionally or 
knowingly engaging in a course of conduct directed at petitioner 
that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress 
herself or to a member of her family." 7 (2) "The respondent knew 
6. ( ... continued) 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge 
that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear 
of bodily injury to himself or a member 
of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a 
member of his immediate family will 
suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person 
of bodily injury to himself or a member 
of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the 
specific person or a member of his 
immediate family. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999). 
7. The court based this conclusion on the following findings: 
1. The respondent maintained a visual or 
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physical proximity to [petitioner] on two or 
more occasions as follows. 
A. On June 17, 1998, the respondent 
drove slowly by the petitioner as she was 
getting out of her car to go into the house 
to have lunch. 
(continued ... ) 
or should have known that the above conduct would cause emotional 
distress to the petitione~ .... "8 
,23 Neither party objected to the court's findings and 
conclusions. Neither party submitted proposed findings and 
conclusions. Neither party moved the court to amend its findings 
or make additional findings pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither party requested a new trial or 
amendment of judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
7. ( ... continued) 
B. On May 18, 1998, the petitioner and 
her husband went to the Old Timers cafe for 
lunch. The respondent circled around the 
restaurant twice and, as the petitioner and 
her husband left the cafe, the respondent 
went to Parley Redds, made a U-turn and 
followed petitioner and her husband to their 
employment at the School District office. 
C. On March 31, 1998, the respondent 
followed the petitioner slowly in his truck 
as she walked home for lunch. 
D. On March 13, 1998, the respondent 
drove by petitioner's' [sic] 6 times. When 
she and her husband were leaving in the car 
to go for a ride, the respondent drove by, 
waiving and honking. 
E. On June 10, 1998, Jeff Bailey, 
husband of the petitioner, was driving from 
Monticello when the respondent pulled up 
close behind Mr. Bailey, then pulled 
alongside him, causing Mr. Bailey to slow 
down. Respondent drove alongside Mr. 
Bailey's vehicle at a speed of about 10 mph 
and then pulled in front of Mr. Bailey and 
came to a complete stop in the road. Mr. 
Bailey then pulled out and went around the 
respondent. 
8. In support of this conclusion, the court found that there was 
[a] stormy marriage of 27 years during which 
the respondent called the petitioner foul and 
obscene names on many occasions, physically 
abused her by slapping her, and threatened 
her with bodily harm by holding a pistol to 
her neck in 1975, and by telling her in the 
opining [sic] day of deer season in the 1990' 
[sic] that he could kill her any time he 
wanted. 
Civil Procedure, and plaintiff neither cross appealed nor argued 
affirmance on alternate grounds. 
~24 Bayles claims that the trial court erred in its application 
of the stalking statute to the facts found in this case. Legal 
determinations regarding the trial court's application of the law 
to the set of facts are reviewed with more deference than the 
trial court's interpretation of the law. See State v. Farrow, 
919 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); accord State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994). Bayles also claims that the trial 
court erred by not making findings on all the elements of the 
stalking statute. "In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its co::-1clusior:s of law tl:.ereon . . . . '' Utah R. Ci.v. 
P. 52(a). 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings 
on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment.' 
The findings of fact must show that the 
court's judgment or decree 'follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence.' 
The findings 'should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.'" 
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
~25 Although the three conjunctive elements of the crime of 
stalking may be based upon a showing of emotional distress or 
reasonable fear of bodily injury, the court based its conclusions 
on the emotional distress prong. This court has stated that 
"[t]he emotional distress [prong] is not satisfied by causing 
mere anxiety or annoyance." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 
1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App 1997) (interpreting the element of 
emotional distress contained in the stalking statute) . 
Furthermore, Lopez requires that "[e]motional distress results 
from conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offends the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
~26 Thus, regarding the trial court's ruling on the first 
element of the stalking statute in light of our ruling in Looez, 
the trial court erred in concluding that Bayles engaged in a 
course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
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emotional distress. 9 Here, the court's findings in support of 
its conclusion that Bayles "intentionally or knowingly engage(d] 
in a course of conduct directed at [Bailey] that would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer emotional distress[,]" do not 
evidence outrageous and intolerable conduct that offends 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Bayles's 
actions of following Bailey and driving by her house would have 
been annoying and may have induced anxiety; however, five such 
instances spread out over a four month period do not support the 
conclusion that Bayles engaged in a course of conduct that would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer anything more than mere 
anxiety or annoyance. Because of our ruling in Lopez, which was 
well argued before the trial court in this case, I would hold 
that the court erred in ics applicatio~ of the emotional discress 
prong of the stalking statute to the findings in this case. 
~27 In reviewing the trial court's application of the second 
element of the stalking statute to the facts in this case, the 
findings support the trial court's conclusion that Bayles knew or 
should have known that his conduct would cause emotional distress 
to Bailey. However, the court did not specifically find, in 
support of this element, that plaintiff suffered from more than 
anxiety and annoyance, perhaps because plaintiff put on no 
objective evidence thereof. Cf. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supolv 
Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993) (holding that emotional 
distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental 
illness); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (finding that emotional distress requires extreme 
outrageous behavior) . 
~28 As for the third element of the stalking statute, the court 
did not make any findings or conclusions regarding whether 
Bayles's conduct actually caused emotional distress in Bailey or 
a member of her family. Consequently, the court committed 
reversible error when it failed to make findings or conclusions 
regarding this material issue. 10 See Butler, 909 P.2d at 231. 
Furthermore, after a caref~l review of the record, it is not 
clear that the facts support only a determination that Bayles's 
conduct had actually caused Bailey to suffer emotional distress. 
See id. 
9. This 11 reasonable person 11 standard ''prevents the finder of 
fact from establishing its own standard and establishes the 
requisite objective standard [to provide fair notice of the 
prohibited conduct]." State v. Reusch, 571 N.W.2d 898, 905 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1997). Bailey introduced virtually no objective 
evidence of emotional distress. 
10. Emotional distress is a material issue because it is one of 
the elements of the crime of stalking. 
~29 Notwithstanding the apparent insufficiency of the findings 
in light of Lopez, a case with which the parties and the trial 
court were familiar, no one objected to the findings and 
conclusions, no one provided the trial court with proposed 
findings and conclusions, no one moved the court to amend its 
findings or make additional findings pursuant to Rule 52(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no one requested a new trial 
or amendment of judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and plaintiff neither cross appealed nor argued 
affirmance on alternate grounds. Under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, I believe to 11 affirm on any ground 11 
implicates due process and is inappropriate. Consequently, I 
would reverse the trial court's order granting Bailey a 
prot?-~iva,_ order against Bayles. 
/ / ( ~ A' 
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